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COMMENT
The JOBS Act and Middle-Income Investors:
Why It Doesn't Go Far Enough
The 2008 recession sparked broad calls for tighter financial regulation.! Yet,
at the same time, small businesses and entrepreneurs lobbied to loosen
restrictions on the funding of start-ups.! Frustrated by stagnant credit markets
and limited access to capital, advocates pushed for reforms that would ease
restrictions on investment and thereby encourage economic growth and job
creation.' The result-the 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS)
Act-allows small businesses to raise capital through "crowdfunding," the
acquisition of small amounts of money from a large number of investors, for
1. Efforts to reform the financial system resulted in a variety of new domestic and international
legal constructs. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, pmbl., 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (aiming to "improv[e] accountability
and transparency in the financial system"); Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Basel III:
A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS 12-29 (2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf (establishing more
stringent capital requirements for banks).
2. Michael Rapoport, Tallying the Lobbying Behind the JOBS Act, WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE
(May 25, 2012, 9:31 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2o12/os/25/tallying-the-lobbying
-behind-the-jobs-act ("The companies and organizations who lobbied Congress to pass the
bill outnumbered those against it by more than a 3-to-1 margin . . . .").
3. Groups lobbying in favor of passage included the National Venture Capital Association, the
Biotechnology Industry Organization, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Id. The push to
ease investment, as well as support for increasing funding for small and
emerging businesses, is not new to the post-recession world. See, e.g., U.S. GovT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-oo-19o, SMALL BUSINESS: EFFORTs To FACILITATE
EQUITY CAPITAL FOIUVIATION 3 (2000) ("[V]enture capital investments tend to be
concentrated[,] . . . raising questions about whether unmet needs . . . are being
addressed.").
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the first time.4 One of the Act's key provisions, the so-called "crowdfunding
exemption," will allow start-ups to obtain investment from a broad spectrum
of investors without the cumbersome and expensive SEC registration
requirements normally demanded of public equity issuers.' Lawmakers and
commentators alike have hailed the potential of the JOBS Act to increase the
flow of funding to start-ups, 6 while offering middle-class investors financial
opportunities previously available only to the wealthy. But, unfortunately, the
Act contains a critical shortcoming that will limit the ability of middle-income
investors to take advantage of these new opportunities. Because most scholarly
commentary on the JOBS Act has focused on the possibility of fraud under the
crowdfunding exemption,' it has largely overlooked the potential benefits
available to investors and the harmful effects of a flaw in the Act that prevents
diversification. This Comment addresses this omission.
4. Crowdfunding has been characterized as "a many-to-one relationship between funders and
recipients" in "the presence of an intermediary, who serves as a matchmaker between
promoters and funders." Edan Burkett, A Crowdfinding Exemption? Online Investment
Crowdfinding and U.S. Securities Regulation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 63, 66-68
(2011). For a brief overview of crowdfunding, see Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfimnding
Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1434 (2012), which
notes that the term crowdfunding "has become synonymous with efforts to raise funds from
numerous donors, usually in small amounts through internet sources."
s. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-lo6, § 302(a), 126 Stat. 3o6,
315 (2012).
6. See, e.g., Heather R. Huhman, JOBS Act To Jumpstart the Job Marketplace, FORBEs (Apr. 5,
2012, 8:oo AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/work-in-progress/2oi2/o4/os/jobs-act-to
-jumpstart-the-job-market; Congressman Cantor Statement on House Vote To Send the
JOBS Act to the President, CONGRESSMAN ERIC CANTOR (Mar. 27, 2012, 2:30 PM),
http://cantor.house.gov/press-releases/congressman-cantor-statement-house-vote-send-jobs
-act-president.
7. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfinding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 931-37 (2011); Karina Sigar,
Fret No More: Inapplicability of Crowdfunding Concerns in the Internet Age and the JOBS Act's
Safeguards, 64 ADMIN. L. REv. 473, 480 (2012). The limited amount of scholarly commentary
concerning investors has focused almost exclusively on the potential for fraud perpetrated
on unsuspecting novices. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfinding or Fraudfinding? Social
Networks and the Securities Laws -Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned
on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REv. 1735, 1765-67 (2012); Jennifer J. Johnson, Fleecing
Grandma: A Regulatory Ponzi Scheme, 16 LEwIS & CLARK L. REV. 993, 994-99 (2012).
Similarly, practitioner blogs, even when discussing fundraising, do not mention the inability
of investment companies to participate. See, e.g., David S. Rose, Is It Legal To Solicit Investors
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Part I describes the landscape of early-stage investing and SEC regulations
limiting this practice to wealthy investors. It also discusses how the JOBS Act
loosens those restrictions. Part II considers the failures of the JOBS Act and
argues that its bar on investment funds will prevent diversification and keep
middle-class investors from taking advantage of the benefits of the Act. Finally,
Part III explores the legislative history of the JOBS Act and shows that the
provisions excluding investment funds cannot be justified by legislative
purpose or existing policy rationales. Overall, this Comment argues that
because of these defects, the individuals who are supposed to be among the
intended beneficiaries of the Act will be blocked from realizing its benefits.
1. EARLY-STAGE INVESTING AND THE JOBS ACT
The JOBS Act was designed to allow a wider class of Americans to invest in
start-ups. Start-up investing, referred to as "venture capital," offers the
potential for exceptional returns, as investors provide risky early financing to
young businesses that appear ripe to grow quickly.! Some venture capitalists
focus on the most turbulent and potentially most profitable part of the market
by investing in extremely young companies, a practice typically referred to as
"angel funding," and its providers as "angels."'
The Securities Act of 1933 severely restricted how all companies, including
these early-stage ventures, could raise funds. The 1933 Act prohibited any
offering or public sale of a security unless it was registered with the SEC or
satisfied one of the statutory exemptions to the registration requirements.o
Registration is expensive and time-consuming, thus effectively requiring
smaller, growing firms to rely on an exemption in order to raise capital."
8. The National Venture Capital Association has defined venture financing as an "equity
investment in a company whose stock is essentially illiquid and worthless until a company
matures five to eight years down the road." Global Insight, Venture Impact: The
Economic Importance of Venture Capital Backed Companies to the U.S. Economy, NAT'L
VENTURE CAPITAL Ass'N 8-9 (2007), http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=comdocman
&task= docdownload&gid=359&Itemid=93.
9. There are a variety of approaches to angel investing. Many angels will only invest in certain
industries or geographies and have varied screening techniques. For one angel's discussion
of his approach, and how he developed it, see Fabrice Grinda, Change in Angel Investment
Strategy, FABRIcE GRINDA: MUSINGS OF AN ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 24, 2008),
http://www.fabricegrinda.com/business-musings/change-in-angel-investment-strategy.
1o. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 5 77(e)(a)(1), 48 Stat. 74, 77 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)).
n. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses' Search for "A Moderate
Capital," 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 91-92 (20o6) ("Registration has never been a viable way for
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Several important exemptions allow "private sales"12 to wealthy "accredited
investors" without registration." An individual can qualify for accredited
investor status by acquiring a net worth of $1 million or earning an annual
salary over $200,ooo.14 This exemption allows wealthy venture capitalists to
angel invest, while also barring middle-class investors. Thus, before the JOBS
Act, small companies seeking to avoid expensive SEC registration could
generally seek funding only from wealthy investors who learned of the start-up
in a private sale, that is, through a close-knit network."
To broaden their funding base beyond the traditional angel network, some
start-up companies began to seek ways to skirt the regulations of the 1933 Act.
small businesses to raise capital. High transaction costs associated with registered offerings
inevitably put registration out of the range of small businesses in search of capital."
(footnotes omitted)); see also Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Overwhelming Case for
Elimination of the Integration Doctrine Under the Securities Act of 1933, 89 Ky. L.J. 289, 294
(2001) (noting that securities laws prevent splitting an offering between private and public
sales, creating a "doctrine [that] is expensive for society and furthers no valid policy"
objective of the 1933 Act).
12. Although the term "private sale" is not clearly defined, courts have held that it refers to
transactions in which a limited number of securities are made available to a small number of
accredited investors and without widespread public advertisement. See, e.g., W. Fed. Corp.
v. Erickson, 739 F.2d 1439, 1442-43 (9 th Cir. 1984); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 644-47
(9 th Cir. 1980); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 1978); Doran v. Petrol.
Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900 (5th Cir. 1977).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)( 5) (allowing unregistered "transactions involving offers or sales by an
issuer solely to one or more accredited investors . . . if there is no advertising or public
solicitation in connection with the transaction by the issuer or anyone acting on the issuer's
behalf'). Accredited investors are the wealthy, sophisticated individuals who presumably do
not "need[] the protection of the [1933] Act." SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125
(1953). The rationale behind exempting accredited investors is that sophisticated clients
"wanted greater freedom in their investment decisions, and they wanted to be free of
restrictive regulations that had been adopted to protect unsophisticated investors such as
those who had been so badly damaged by the Stock Market Crash of 1929." Jerry W.
Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor-Jungle Predator or Shorn Lamb?, 12 YALE J. ON
REG. 345, 353-54 (1995).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)-(6) (2012).
15. Other exemptions to the registration requirements exist but are less helpful for early-stage
start-ups. Companies can issue securities under Regulation A, but the amount that can be
sold is limited and the company is still required to file a registration statement with the
SEC. Id. § 230.251. Regulation D allows additional sales to accredited investors and a small
number of non-accredited investors. Id. §§ 230.500-.508. Under this rule, however,
investors are prohibited from reselling these securities, issuers are not allowed to advertise
sales, and they must still comply with state law requirements. In view of these limitations,
the standard exemption in the 1933 Act for private sales to accredited investors remains
critical. For background on Regulation D, see Manning Gilbert Warren III, A Review of
Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of
1933, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 355 (1984).
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Companies explored various methods for crowdsourcing capital online without
violating SEC rules. The two most common avenues were to seek advance
product sales, as with the online portal Kickstarter,s or to use certain types of
debt. 17 Both strategies, however, proved to be unworkable for most companies.
Advanced sales platforms are used to sell products, not to fund abstract
research or development,'" and debt often requires scheduled interest
payments, which are difficult for a cash-poor start-up to make.'9 Although
some entrepreneurs did attempt to use online crowdsourcing tools to raise
equity,2 o the SEC's definition of security was so broad as to implicate virtually
any mechanism where a purchaser shares in the profitability of the enterprise,
thus triggering the registration requirements." True equity investments would
16. Kickstarter and Indiegogo are examples of online portals that provide crowdsourced
advanced sales financing. These sites allow individuals to pledge funds to various projects or
start-ups in exchange for their products when they are produced. Since Kickstarter launched
in April 2009, "over $450 million has been pledged by more than 3 million people, funding
more than 35,000 creative projects." Kickstarter Basics: Kickstarter iol, KiCKSTARTER,
http://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter%2obasics#Kick (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
17. Sites such as Prosper and Lending Tree allow people to finance small expenditures for
themselves or for a business with crowdsourced debt. See Peter Renton, Peer to Peer Lending
Crosses $i Billion in Loans Issued, TECHCRUNCH (May 29, 2012), http://techcrunch.com
/2012/o5/29/peer-to-peer-lending-crosses-l-billion-in-loans-issued.
18. Advanced sales are also cumbersome to use when the product is simply poorly defined.
Kickstarter could not have funded Facebook, for example, because there was no defined
product to sell. Financing through advanced sales also results in less efficient capital
acquisition when the start-up must fundraise for large investments. See Paul Belleflame,
Thomas Lambert & Armin Schwienbacher, Crowdfinding: Tapping the Right Crowd 25-26
(CORE Discussion Paper No. 2011/32, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578175.
ig. Even if cash were available, entrepreneurs would likely prefer to reinvest the funds in the
high-growth start-up rather than return it to lenders. Recently, some entrepreneurs have
been structuring initial capital infusions as convertible debt to simplify fundraising. See Dan
Primack, Start-up Savior? Killing Convertible Debt, CNNMoNEY (Aug. 31, 2012, 1:oo PM),
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2oi2/o8/3i/killing-convertible-debt (noting that "almost
50% of angel deals were convertible debt" in 2011). These investments, however, often
operate as equity due to the limited collateral and close relationships between founders and
investors. David Gass, Convertible Debt: Should Entrepreneurs Consider This Option
with Angel Investors?, FAST Co. (July 7, 2011), http://www.fastcompany.com/1759856
/convertible-debt-should-entrepreneurs-consider-option-angel-investors.
20. See Cohn, supra note 4, at 1435 (discussing the website SellaBand, which helps musicians
seek tour funding and offers their backers a share of revenue); Daniel M. Satorius & Stu
Pollard, Crowd Funding: What Independent Producers Should Know About the Legal Pitfalls, 28
ENT. & SPORTS L. 15, 16-17 (2010); Ray Ring, Saving journalism by 'Crowdfunding,' HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.hcn.org/issues/415/innovate-part-i/article
_view?b start:int=2&-C=.
21. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (defining a security as an "investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others
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allow small businesses the chance to achieve a broader funding base, but they
remained blocked by the 1933 Act's restrictions.
In 2012, the JOBS Act amended the Securities Act of 1933 to finally allow
for crowdfunded equity. Specifically, the JOBS Act created a new
class of "emerging" companies2 that could engage in crowdfunding while
remaining exempt from registration requirements. This crowdfunding
exemption - section 302 of the JOBS Act - allows emerging companies to raise
up to a total of $1 million annually from individuals who do not meet the
"accredited investor" threshold. As a check on fraud, the amount that
companies can raise is limited by the quality of their financial controls. For
example, the full $1 million is available to companies only if their financial
statements are audited by an independent public accountant, 4 whereas a
company may raise under $1oo,ooo by providing little more than an income
tax statement and unaudited financials.2 s Similarly, the Act established limits
for investors as well. Investors may devote only up to five or ten percent of
their income, depending on whether they earned more than $1oo,ooo in the
previous year." Furthermore, all investments must take place under the aegis
of an approved broker or online portal." Within these guidelines, anyone- not
just wealthy, accredited individuals -can invest in the equity of start-ups.
By increasing access to venture capital investing, the JOBS Act appears to
offer significant benefits to middle-class investors. The vast majority of
Americans, who do not qualify as "accredited investors,",, will now be able to
make their own investments in emerging companies. Although this investing is
[regardless of] whether the enterprise is speculative or non-speculative or whether there is a
sale of property with or without intrinsic value"). Registrants also have to comply with state
law restrictions. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABIITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 28.
22. Emerging companies must have under $i billion in revenue and under $1 billion in
nonconvertible debt. They also cannot be registered with the SEC as a large accelerated filer.
JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-lo6, § ioi(a), 126 Stat. 306, 308 (2012).
23. Id. § 302(a).
24. Id. § 302(b). Full audited financials are required for any fundraising above $5oo,ooo. Id.
2S. Id. In addition, a company may raise between $ioo,ooo and $500,000 by providing
"financial statements reviewed by a public accountant who is independent of the issuer,
using professional standards and procedures for such review or standards and procedures
established by the Commission, by rule, for such purpose." Id. For a more thorough review
of these tiers of fundraising and auditing requirements, see Cohn, supra note 4, at 1441-42.
26. JOBS Act § 302(a). The JOBS Act allows investors with incomes below $40,000 per year to
invest up to $2,000. Id.
27. Id. §§ 302(a), 304(b).
28. For the income demographic breakdown of the U.S. population, see Statistical Abstract of the
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risky, it offers the potential for exceptionally high returns. Early-stage venture
funds have outperformed the benchmark Dow Jones Small Cap Index and the
S&P 5oo over the past 5-year, 15-year, and 20-year periods. 9 More importantly,
this new asset class can provide enhanced portfolio diversification. With
venture capital, investors can diversify away from publicly traded stocks and
savings accounts, and protect a portion of their savings from a market
downturn and low interest rates.30 A key failing in the Act, however, will
effectively prevent middle-class investors from reaping these benefits.
II. THE FAILURE OF THE JOBS ACT TO ALLOW DIVERSIFICATION
When the JOBS Act was passed, the final version included a little-discussed
provision that will limit the ability of middle-class investors to participate in
venture investing." Section 302(b) prohibits "investment companies" from
operating under the Act, preventing companies that make investments for
others from offering mutual fund-type products. This exclusion will make it
very difficult, if not impossible, for middle-income investors to diversify their
holdings.
Diversification is critically important to investors in general, and potentially
even more so in the context of angel investing. Modern finance theory clearly
articulates that portfolio diversification, the inclusion of assets with
uncorrelated returns, will lower overall risk.3 ' This suggests that diversification
29. U.S. Venture Capital Index and Selected Benchmark Statistics, CAMBRIDGE Assocs. (Sept. 30,
2012), http://www.cambridgeassociates.conVpdf/Venture%2oCapital%2olndex.pdf. The
report also notes, however, that venture capital has underperformed in the short term (less
than three years) and on the ten-year horizon. Other commentators have also called into
question whether venture capital, excepting the late-199os Internet boom, offers sustainable
long-term returns. See Diane Mulcahy, Bill Weeks & Harold S. Bradley, "We Have Met the
Enemy ... and He Is Us": Lessons from Twenty Years of the Kauffman Foundation's Investments
in Venture Capital Funds and the Triumph ofHope over Experience, EWING MARION KAUFFMAN
FOUND. (May 2012), http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedfiles/vc-enemy-is-us-report.pdf.
3o. Regardless of total return, however, venture capital investments can still offer benefits
provided they are not perfectly correlated with the remainder of the portfolio. For a broader
discussion on the impact of diversification, see infra Part II. Note that the benefits of
diversifying among different types of investments (e.g., holding venture capital as well as
stocks and bonds) can be just as important as holding multiple instruments in one
investment class, so the logic described below applies equally in this case.
31. JOBS Act § 302(b).
32. TIM KOLLER, MARC GOEDHART & DAVID WESSELS, VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING
THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 33 (5 th ed. 2010); BEVIs LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE (1986).
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can increase overall returns if the risk level is kept constant." With early-stage
companies, in particular, investments often assume a bifurcated return profile.
Most companies fail, taking with them the cash contributed by investors; a few
others achieve modest returns; and, occasionally, a company will be extremely
successful and return multiples of the capital invested. 4 In early-stage
investing, perhaps more than any other field, the prudent investor must have a
well-diversified set of investments to ensure that the failures are balanced by
the superstars.
The easiest way to diversify an investment portfolio is to participate in a
pooled fund managed by a professional investor. By pooling capital, even an
investor with limited resources can gain the benefits of diversification by
spreading her capital among several different start-ups. Thus, even if several
companies fail, investors may still be able to obtain an attractive return on
average. The same principle has worked successfully in common stocks, with
over thirteen trillion dollars invested by Americans in diversified mutual funds
and similar vehicles."
Despite the obvious benefits of pooled funds, the JOBS Act specifically
prevents investors from making investments through a professional fund by
excluding "investment companies" from the new provisions. This prevents
the JOBS Act from being used to fund any entity which "is or holds itself out as
being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of
investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities."" Since investment companies
cannot be considered emerging companies, no exemption from the SEC
registration requirements applies. Middle-income investors thus cannot invest
33. Diversification reduces risk, and the investor can then increase returns by decreasing
holdings in riskless assets or increasing the leverage on the portfolio, returning to the
original level of risk. For more on the impact of diversification on a portfolio and modern
portfolio theory, see DAVID F. SWENSEN, PIONEERING PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: AN
UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT (2000).
34. According to the National Venture Capital Association, 49 venture-backed IPOs and 449
successful acquisitions were recorded in 2012. Yearbook 2013, NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS'N
49-50 (2013), http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id= 257
&Itemid= 103. A total of 3,143 companies received investment in the same period. Id. at 27.
Assuming a similar ratio over time, the implication holds that over 2,600 companies, or
nearly 85%, fail even after reaching the venture capital stage.
35. 2011 Investment Company Fact Book, INv. Co. INST. 8 (2011), http://www.ici.org/pdf
/201-factbook.pdf. This comprises twenty-three percent of all corporate ownership. Id. at
12 fig.1.5. For a discussion tracing the origins of mutual funds back to early Dutch investors'
desires for diversification, see K. Geert Rouwenhorst, The Origins ofMutual Funds (Yale ICF
Working Paper No. 04-48, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=636146.
36. JOBS Act § 302(b).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-3 (20o6).
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with them, even if only to create a pooled vehicle for investing in other
start-ups. Furthermore, the Internet portals that will facilitate transactions
under the Act cannot assist in pooling capital, as they must not specifically
promote any individual start-ups and cannot hold investors' money to make
investments themselves."8 Thus, the easiest way for investors to gain
diversification, an investment fund, is legally precluded by the text of the Act
itself.39
One might argue that investors can build their own diversified portfolio
and would not need a pooled vehicle. There are practical concerns that make
this unlikely, however. First, the JOBS Act primarily increases investment
opportunities for middle-income Americans. Middle-class investors may not
have the time or resources to research multiple illiquid start-ups. Second, many
investors lack the skill to evaluate these companies-which may not yet have
products, prototypes, or customers-and would rather defer to a professional
with investment expertise or technical knowledge of the sector in which the
start-up operates. Lastly, many start-ups may set minimums on the amount
that investors can contribute to simplify bookkeeping. For example, even if the
minimum is set at a modest $5oo, an investor who is only able to dedicate
$2,000 per year to angel investing will be unable to achieve diversification
within a reasonable time horizon. Offering pooled investment vehicles would
not require investors to use them, of course. Those who prefer to invest
directly could still do so. By excluding them, however, investors are deprived of
their choice in the matter, and, most critically, many simply will not be able to
invest in start-ups.
III. AN UNSUPPORTED EXCLUSION
In light of the many advantages of pooled funds, it is difficult to
understand why investment companies were excluded from the Act. When the
JOBS Act passed the House, the bill had been viewed as an uncontroversial
measure designed to increase funding flowing to small businesses4o and did not
38. JOBS Act § 304.
3g. Of course, there may be alternative ways for investors to attempt to gain diversification or
expertise. But many solutions, such as hiring a private consultant, are likely to be so
expensive as to make any investment unprofitable. Other options, such as relying on
information from a professional manager or an informal network of friends, may present
complicated incentive structures or conflicts of interest that may be unappealing or even
harmfil to the investor.
40. The JOBS Act passed the House overwhelmingly, with only twenty-three votes in
opposition. Final Vote Results for Roll Call lo, CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF
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include the language prohibiting the participation of investment companies."1
Indeed, the subject of middle-class investors' portfolio diversification seems
not to have come up at all during the House floor debate."
The prohibition against investment funds appears to have been a late
addition to the JOBS Act motivated by an interest in investor protection. Some
Senators expressed concern that the House bill lacked sufficient protections
against fraud. In response, Senator Merkley introduced Senate Amendment
1884, which included the prohibition against investment fund participation in
the JOBS Act and was incorporated into the final version of the bill. The
amendment was hurriedly considered and passed with limited debate.
Although the investment company exclusion was added as part of the Merkley
Amendment's package of consumer protection measures, there was no
discussion in the record of how the specific provision banning investment
funds would help protect either consumers or investors.43 Many of the new
provisions included in the Amendment-such as those requiring disclosure of
company financials, establishing officer liability for the accuracy of such
information, and mandating the use of approved online intermediaries to
screen investments-had an obvious investor-protection rationale.4 It is less
clear, however, what purpose was served by excluding investment companies. 45
Given the limited congressional debate on the investment company
exclusion, the policy rationale for this provision was left unstated. It is unlikely
that this amendment was designed to prevent outright fraud on the part of
investment companies-that is, to prevent a company from gathering a large
pot of assets and then fleeing. This problem is not unique to investment
REPRESENTATIVES (Mar. 8, 2012), http://clerk.house.gov/eVs/2012/rolllio.xml (last visited
Jan. 31, 2013). Bipartisan support extended to the Senate as well: "We are in the middle of
March Madness here. To use a basketball metaphor: This is a layup. Let's get it done." 158
CONG. REC. S1876 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2012) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
41. The House version required only that an intermediary "not offer investment advice." H.R.
3606, 112th Cong. § 301(b) (2d Sess. 2012).
42. See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. H1275 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2012).
43. 158 CONG. REC. S1887 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2012) (statement of Sen. Merkley).
44. Id.
45. This specific proposal received no mention in the Congressional Record. When the House
received the revised bill, many representatives questioned whether the Senate amendments,
including the prohibition on investment company activities, went too far, but did not alter
the Senate text. 158 CONG. REc. H1590-92 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012). In all House
commentary, as in the Senate, however, the entire discussion centered on balancing the
concerns of fraud on investors with start-up access to capital; the impact of diversification
was not discussed. See id. at H1586-93; id. at H1597-98.
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companies.4* Any scam can masquerade as a start-up; in fact, crowdflnding
may be particularly susceptible to fraud, with the most promising and
legitimate ideas expecting to receive funding through traditional channels. To
protect against fraud, the JOBS Act and the Merkley Amendment already
mandate certain safeguards. If those safeguards are insufficient, then this
concern implicates the entire Act.4 1 Making investment less attractive by
prohibiting pooled funds will not solve this issue and may make it worse if
sophisticated individuals who recognize the importance of diversification
refuse to participate in the market.
The prohibition on investment company activities may have also been
motivated by an unstated concern about those firms' incentives and ability to
exploit investors. Investment companies often charge a performance fee based
on returns, as well as a flat management fee determined as a percentage of their
total assets. They may be tempted to increase their assets to raise their flat
management fee. An investor might therefore entrust funds to a manager with
a primary incentive not to invest well, but to gather as many clients as
possible."5 This problem, however, is solvable. Investment companies targeting
the crowdsourced space can simply be prevented from taking management fees
and forced to rely instead on performance-based investment returns. In this
way, the incentives of the retail investors and their hired guns would be better
aligned.49 Similarly, the funding portals could require a robust disclosure
regime to allow customers to make informed choices between providers and
help them select those that deliver the most value for their investors.so
46. Nor is the danger of fraud unique to middle-class investors. The rich can be fleeced as well,
as noted by Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 151, 152 n.8, 191-92 (2010).
47. See supra note 7.
48. Finance literature frequently highlights the problems associated with the collection of
management fees as a percentage of assets. See, e.g., Andr6 F. Pernold & Robert S. Solomon,
Jr., The Right Amount ofAssets Under Management, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 1991, at 31.
49. Of course, an investment company could still make more money in absolute terms by
having a greater pool of assets under management. But, under this scenario, at least the
investment company would only earn money if investors did as well. Also, it is somewhat
unlikely that conventional venture capital firms, which prefer to concentrate on larger
investments, would participate in crowdfunded investments. It is more likely that the
aggregators would be angel investors, seeking to attract additional publicity to some of their
products, or other smaller entities.
50. Disclosure requirements are often discussed as a method of assisting even unknowledgeable
investors. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-2 (2010) (requiring brokers to make disclosures to
consumers in penny-stock transactions); see also Markham, supra note 13, at 378-81 (arguing
that institutional investors should be required to sign risk disclosure statements).
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Alternatively, this provision may be a result of historical reporting
concerns. Investment companies have traditionally been subject to a wide
variety of reporting rules that the JOBS Act does not waive, such as those in
Dodd-Franks" and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.s2 It is possible that
investment companies were excluded from the JOBS Act for fear of lowering
the disclosure threshold generally." However, removing the investment
company exclusion would allow firms to offer pooled vehicles in the
crowdsourced space, without waiving the disclosure, governance, and
reporting restrictions contained in other U.S. securities laws that would remain
in force.
Ultimately, however, these concerns appear to fall short. None of them are
of sufficient weight to override the significant financial benefits to middle-class
investors, as well as to start-ups, from allowing the use of diversified, pooled
investment vehicles. Without a clear policy justification, the prohibition on
investment funds appears to be unfounded, failing to protect investors and
undermining a basic purpose of the JOBS Act.
CONCLUSION
The JOBS Act was designed to energize the American economy. The
legislation loosened restrictions on equity investing, allowing capital to flow to
start-ups and making venture capital investing more egalitarian. In its rush to
ensure that middle-class investors would be protected, however, Congress may
have moved too far. The blanket prohibition on investment funds will not only
fail to protect the middle class, but it will prevent average investors from taking
advantage of the Act's benefits. Thus, one of the JOBS Act's greatest
promises - enabling middle-class investors access to a new asset class - appears
unrealized.
JAMES J. WILLIAMSON
51. 12 U.S.C. § 53 01(12)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 2012).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 8ob-2(a)(ui) (2006).
53. Generally Applicable Questions on Title I of the JOBS Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (May 3, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfjjobsactfaq
-title-i-general.htm.
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